



















Western Washington University 




Simon Fraser University 




Address Correspondence to: 
Daniel Shapiro 
Simon Fraser University, Harbour Centre 
Faculty of Business Administration 









May 2002 (revised) 
 
The authors thank Industry Canada, Microeconomic Policy Branch for financial support. Dr. 
Someshwar Rao was inspirational in suggesting the original focus of the study.  Mark Wilson 
provided excellent research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at seminars 
at Rutgers University and Western Washington University. The comments of seminar 
participants are gratefully acknowledged. Discussions with Paul Storer were especially helpful, 
as were the comments of three unidentified reviewers. 
  1JIBS 
 




This paper examines the statistical importance of governance infrastructure as a 
determinant of U.S. foreign direct investment. In broad terms, governance infrastructure 
represents attributes of legislation, regulation, and legal systems that condition freedom of 
transacting, security of property rights and transparency of government and legal processes. Our 
econometric analysis employs a two-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, the probability 
that a country is an FDI recipient is estimated.  The results indicate that countries that fail to 
achieve a minimum threshold of effective governance are unlikely to receive any U.S. FDI.  
Countries that receive no U.S. FDI are typically countries that do not promote free and 
transparent markets, have ineffective governments, and are often countries whose legal systems 
are not rooted in English Common Law. In the second stage, the analysis is restricted to those 
countries that did receive FDI flows.  The estimated equations focus on the determinants of the 
amount of FDI received. Given that a country is a recipient of U.S. FDI, governance 
infrastructure, including the nature of the legal system, is an important determinant of the amount 
received.    
 
 





  2 
Introduction 
 
The international business literature has recognized the importance of country-specific 
political and institutional factors as determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.  
Empirical analyses of FDI routinely include some kind of variable to control for inter-country 
differences in the broad political environment (Tuman and Emmert, 1999; Mody and Srinivasan, 
1998; Stevens, 2000;  Bevan and Estrin, 2000; Morisset, 2000; Altomonte, 2000; Wei, 2000), 
albeit with somewhat mixed results (Dawson,1998).  At the same time, recent empirical evidence 
indicates that cross-country differences in growth and productivity are related to differences in 
political, institutional and legal environments (OECD, 2001; Hall and Jones, 1999; Keefer and 
Knack, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Levine, 1998; Kaufman et. al. 1999b).
1   
We refer to these broad political and legal institutions as the governance infrastructure of 
a country. The governance infrastructure of a country helps to define its investment environment. 
A .favorable. governance infrastructure creates beneficial conditions for investment and 
economic growth.  Since the investment environment of a country affects both domestic and 
foreign investors, we expect that FDI will be attracted to regions characterized by more 
favourable governance infrastructures, all other things constant.  Also, since inward FDI 
contributes to improved productivity in developed host economies (Blomstrom, Kokko and 
Globerman, 2001), the linkage between FDI and governance infrastructure is of obvious policy 
relevance. Our paper therefore focuses on the linkage between specific measures of governance 
infrastructure and U.S. FDI flows. 
This paper extends the FDI literature in several ways.
2   First, we utilize newly developed 
measures to examine the effects of governance infrastructure on U.S. FDI outflows to a broad 
sample of developed and developing countries over the period 1995-97.  Specifically, we employ 
the indices developed by Kaufman et. al. (1999a), and the legal classification systems developed 
by LaPorta et. al. (1998a,b)  and the University of Ottawa Law School to measure governance 
infrastructure.
3  These various measures, described below, cover a broad range of institutional, 
legal and policy characteristics available for a large sample of countries.  In particular, they 
include factors not commonly found in the FDI literature, notably classifications of the nature of 
the legal system, as well as measures of the effectiveness of government, the regulatory 
environment, and the degree of graft.  
  3Second, we use a two-stage estimation procedure to account for the possibility of sample 
selection bias (Heckman, 1979).  In the present context, sample selection bias may arise if the 
sample is limited to countries that are recipients of U.S. FDI. In fact, there are a large number of 
countries in which either no positive FDI flows from the United States were recorded for our 
sample period, or the country was not listed at all in the Bureau of Economic Analysis data that 
we employ. In order to avoid sample selection bias, we first estimate the likelihood of a country 
enjoying positive inflows of FDI from the United States and then estimate the determinants of 
the magnitude of the positive inflows.  In the first stage, the probit method is used to estimate the 
probability that the US invests in a particular country.  In the second stage, ordinary least squares 
estimates of the determinants of the amount of FDI (given that it is positive) are provided.  The 
second stage equation includes Mills’ Ratio which is derived from the first-stage estimates and 
which accounts for selection bias.  Separate estimates of our equations are provided for samples 
including both developing and developed countries, as well as for developing countries, 
separately.  
Finally, we investigate the possibility that the determinants of FDI, and in particular the 
importance of governance infrastructure, are different across industries. It is often suggested that 
an increasing share of FDI is either skill-seeking or efficiency-seeking, often in high-technology 
industries  (Dunning, 1993).  Such investments are primarily attracted by the availability of 
skilled human capital, as well as by the availability of infrastructure investments, particularly in 
transportation and communications.  We therefore provide separate estimates for U.S. FDI flows 
in two high-technology industries. 
Our results indicate that governance infrastructure is an important determinant of location 
choice by U.S. investors.  Countries that receive no U.S. FDI are typically countries that have 
weak governance structures, and are often countries whose legal systems are not rooted in 
English Common Law.  For those countries that do not receive FDI, investments in governance 
infrastructure should result in more foreign investment. Since most of the countries that do not 
receive U.S. FDI are small and developing, the benefits, in terms of inflows, are most 
pronounced for those countries. Moreover, given that a country is a recipient of U.S. FDI, 
governance infrastructure, including the nature of the legal system, is an important determinant 
of the amount received.  Thus, investments in better governance infrastructure will also increase 
FDI inflows. 
  4The study proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the definition and 
measurement of governance infrastructure.  We then present the model to be estimated, and the 
data employed, followed by a discussion of the estimation technique and results. A summary and 
conclusions is provided in the final section. 
 
Governance Infrastructure 
  Broadly speaking, governance infrastructure comprises public institutions and policies 
created by governments as a framework for economic, legal and social relations.  We are most 
concerned with those elements of the governance infrastructure that can affect the investment 
decisions of multinational corporations (MNCs). A beneficial governance infrastructure might 
therefore include: an effective, impartial and transparent legal system that protects property and 
individual rights; public institutions that are stable, credible and honest; and government policies 
that favour free and open markets.
4  These conditions encourage FDI, and presumably private 
domestic investment as well, by protecting privately held assets from arbitrary direct or indirect 
appropriation.  In a related manner, the same conditions encourage sunk cost investments by 
MNCs that facilitate efficient operation in host countries.  Thus, our basic hypothesis is that 
countries with better governance infrastructures are more likely to attract U.S. FDI, other things 
equal. 
As we use the term, governance infrastructure is similar to the notion of social 
infrastructure used by Hall and Jones (1999) in that the definition includes both institutions and 
policies.  We prefer the term governance infrastructure because it is readily distinguishable from 
related notions of physical infrastructure, social capital and human capital.
5   
  We measure governance infrastructure using several indicators.  We first employ the six 
governance measures estimated by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton  (1999a and 1999b). 
These indices (which we will refer to as KKZL indices) describe various aspects of the 
governance structures of a broad cross-section of countries.  The six indices measure: 1. Voice, 
political freedom and civil liberties (VOICE): 2.Political instability, terrorism and violence 
(STAB); 3. The rule of law, crime, contract enforcement and property rights (LAW); 4. The level 
of graft and corruption in public and private institutions (GRAFT); 5. The extent of regulation 
and market openness, including tariffs and import controls (REG); and 6. Measures of 
government effectiveness and efficiency (GOV).   
  5The indices have been estimated (using an unobserved components model) employing 31 
different qualitative indicators from 13 different sources, including BERI, DRI/McGraw Hill, the 
Heritage Foundation, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum and the Economist 
Intelligence Unit.
6 Thus, they are effectively meta-indices encompassing a wide range of 
measures and sources, and they should provide more precise measures of governance than 
individual indicators. Another advantage is that the measures are available for a large number of 
countries (between 145 and 158).  A disadvantage is that they are estimated, and thus subject to 
measurement error.  In addition, the indices are so highly correlated with each other that it is 
very difficult to use them all in a single equation.  We have therefore created an aggregate 
measure estimated as the first principal component of the six measures.  We refer to this 
aggregated governance infrastructure index as GII.  We also consider the role of the individual 
indices as explained below. 
  Although the KKZL measures are comprehensive, and do provide an index of the rule of 
law, they do not explicitly account for the recent literature which focuses on the importance of 
the origins of the legal system.
7  In particular, LaPorta et. al. (1998a, 1999, 2001) and Djankov 
et. al. (2002) argue that countries whose commercial legal systems are rooted in English 
Common Law better protect shareholders and creditors, better preserve property rights, and are 
associated with less regulation of markets.  These studies therefore suggest that English Common 
Law facilitates the development of capital markets and investment opportunities.  We therefore 
expect that countries whose legal systems originate in English Common Law will attract more 
FDI.  Conversely, the greater formalism of civil law regimes is associated with higher expected 
durations of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less honesty and fairness and inferior access 
to justice.  As a consequence, investment incentives in civil law regimes should be weaker than 
in common law regimes, all other things constant.  
  LaPorta et. al. (1998b) have classified a large number of countries according to the origin 
of their commercial or corporate legal codes.  Specifically, they classify countries’ legal systems 
as having their origins in English Common Law (ENGLAW), civil law of French, German or 
Scandinavian origin (FRELAW, GERLAW, SCALAW), or socialist law (SOCLAW).  One 
disadvantage of this measure is that it classifies all formerly communist countries in the last 
category, and therefore possibly conflates the role of legal systems with other factors. 
  6The University of Ottawa Faculty of Law provides an alternative taxonomy.  They 
classify legal systems according to whether their origins are in common or civil law, but provide 
somewhat different categories within each.  Pure common law systems (COMLAW1) are based 
primarily on English Common Law, and assign a pre-eminent position to case law, not 
legislation.  Mixed common law systems (COMLAW2) blend English Common Law with 
elements of customary or religious (usually Muslim) law.  Pure civil law (CIVLAW1) systems 
are based on the Roman system and give precedence to codified, written law; mixed civil law 
(CIVLAW2) systems combine elements of civil law with customary or religious law.  Under this 
classification method, most formerly communist countries are defined as having either pure or 
mixed civil law systems.  
We therefore measure governance infrastructure in a number of ways.  We view the two 
legal system classifications as substitutes. Hence, we do not consider them in the same 
estimating equation. The relationship among these measures is further discussed below. 
  
Modelling U.S. FDI Flows 
The basic question we seek to address is whether governance infrastructure, as measured 
by some or all of the indicators discussed above, affects U.S. FDI flows across countries. Our 
two-stage model is summarized in the following way: 
 
(1) FDIit* = α0 + α1 GOVERNANCEit +  α2 X1 it-1 + ε1it, 
 
where FDIit* is a latent variable, defined such that FDIit = 1 (country i is a recipient of U.S. FDI) 
if FDIit* >0   and FDIit = 0 (country i is not a recipient of U.S. FDI) if FDIit* = 0 or <0;
8 
GOVERNANCE is one or more of the measures (or sets of measures) defined above; X1 is a 
vector of control variables; and ε1it  is a normally distributed error term.  We hypothesize that 
α1>0 for the continuous governance measures, and for countries whose legal systems originate in 
English Common Law. 
 
(2) Ln FDIit =  β0 + β1 GOVERNANCEit + β2 X2 it-1 + β3 Mills + ε2it, 
 
  7where Ln FDI is the natural logarithm of the dollar value of U.S. FDI flows received by country i 
in time t; GOVERNANCE is as above; X2 is a vector of control variables, some of which are the 
same as X1 above; Mills is the inverse of Mills’ ratio derived from (1); and ε2it  is a normally 
distributed error term. We hypothesize that β1>0 for the continuous governance measures, and 
for countries whose legal systems originate in English Common Law.  The natural log value of 
FDI is utilized so as to minimize the influence of .extreme. values of that variable.  In fact, our 
results, to be reported, are insensitive to the precise specification of the FDI variable. 
  Equation (1) is a simple Probit specification, whereby a country is an FDI recipient if it 
surpasses a critical value of an index, FDI*.  The value of the index is a linear combination of its 
governance infrastructure (GOVERNANCE) and other variables (X1).  Equation (2) is a basic 
linear equation, confined to observations where FDI>0. It includes the inverse of Mills’ ratio to 
test for sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). 
 
Data and Measurement 
  The data for this study were obtained for a cross-section of countries over the period 
1994-1997.  The variables and their sources are summarized in Table 1, and are discussed in 
more detail below. The FDI data are measured over the three-year period, 1995-97, while other 
explanatory variables were measured, where possible, using a one-year lag. Thus, for each 
country there are a maximum of three years of data. At the time the data were collected, 1997 
marked the last year for which FDI data were available, and this determined the end-date. At the 
same time, several key independent variables were available only from the mid-1990s, which 
conditions the chosen start-date. For some variables, data were available for every year, but for 
others, including the governance infrastructure measures, they were not.  Hence, our ability to 
create a complete time-series panel was limited. Nevertheless, we pooled the data to increase 
sample size and the reliability of the estimates.
9
The number of observations was limited by the availability of data.  For the first-stage 
probit estimates, the number of sample countries was limited by the availability of the KKZL 
indices and other variables. Specifically, we were able to compile data for 143 countries, of 
which 88 were recipients of positive U.S. FDI flows in at least one year. Some data were missing 
for individual years, resulting in 404 observations of which 223 were positive. The 88 countries 
(223 observations) served as the basis for the second-stage estimates. Developing and transition 
  8economies were defined as non-OECD members excepting Hong Kong and Singapore, resulting 
in 115 countries so classified (320 observations), of which 62 (152 observations) were FDI 
recipients. Given the limited industry detail regarding U.S. FDI, two industries were explicitly 
identified as technology-intensive: electrical equipment and chemicals. In order to ensure a 
sufficient number of observations, we pooled these two industries, resulting in 39 countries (108 
observations) that were recipients of high-tech FDI. 
 
The Dependent Variables 
We measure FDI in terms of flows, mainly for practical reasons relating to data 
availability. In the first stage of the estimation process, the dependent variable is defined to take 
a value of unity if there were positive U.S. FDI flows to the sample country in a given year 
during the sample period (1995-97), and zero otherwise.
10 In the second stage, the logarithm of 
the average dollar value of U.S. FDI received in that year is used as the dependent variable.  The 
logarithmic specification was chosen because it is consistent with gravity models, but in practice 
the results are not changed when absolute or proportionate measures are used.
11  High-
technology industries are defined as the chemical and allied industries, and the electric and 
electronics industry, and U.S. FDI in high-tech is the sum of FDI in these industries. 
    
Included Control Variables 
The choice of control variables (independent variables in addition to governance 
measures) was based on the existing theoretical and empirical literature, although the 
specification chosen was constrained by data availability.  Our goal was to create parsimonious 
specifications for each equation while effectively controlling for the large number of factors that 
have been found to influence FDI flows. Conceptually, the same variables should be included in 
both the first- and second-stage estimations.  We will discuss the exact specification of each 
equation in the next section. 
Although the FDI literature has discussed a large number of potential determinants of 
FDI, surprisingly few are consistently significant across the broad set of empirical studies that 
have been performed.
12  One variable that is consistently statistically significant is a measure of 
the host country’s size, usually identified by a measure of real gross domestic product (GDP).
13  
Large market size is expected to attract FDI because of economies of scale in production and 
  9distribution for products sold in the host market.  In addition, large markets may be associated 
with agglomeration economies that lower costs for all producers in that market.  Contributing to 
the relevant agglomeration economies may be the availability of highly specialized inputs that 
cannot be found in smaller markets.
14  Like FDI, and for similar reasons, GDP is measured in 
logarithms in our models.  The GDP coefficient measures the elasticity of FDI flows in the 
second-stage estimations, and should be positive. 
To the extent possible, we attempted to measure the relevant independent variables for a 
prior period.  GDP is therefore measured in U.S. dollars over the period 1994-1996.  The GDP 
variable was lagged both to allow for adjustment lags, and to reduce the potential for a bias 
created by the dependent variable (FDI) causing higher values of GDP. 
We use the U.N. Human Development Index (HDI) as a summary measure of a variety of 
factors that have been found to influence FDI.  This index is now available for 168 countries, 
although not for every year. HDI is derived from three sub-indices: GDP/population, educational 
literacy and enrolment, and life expectancy at birth.  The measures are available for 1995 and 
1997, and we use their average value for 1996.  The health and education components are direct 
measures of human capital.  The GDP per capita component is a measure of wealth that has 
traditionally been used to measure consumer demand, but it may also serve as a proxy measure 
for the amount of physical infrastructure.
15 Increased values of human capital and physical 
infrastructure should be positively related, on average, to inward FDI (Mody and Srinivasan, 
1998), but the role of health has to our knowledge not been explored. In addition, recent 
evidence suggests that the location decisions of foreign investors may be influenced by quality of 
life variables, (Peterson, Malhota and Wagner, 1999).  In this regard, GDP per capita is a 
measure of quality of life, although one that has been recently questioned (OECD, 2001).  
Indeed, HDI might be viewed as a broad measure of quality of life. Other things equal, we expect 
that higher levels of HDI will attract more FDI. 
The literature also suggests that FDI flows may be affected by exchange rates. We 
measure these effects in two ways.  First, we include dummy variables identifying countries that 
operated with fixed exchange rates (in 1996).  We further distinguish those countries whose 
currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar (FIXUS) from those whose currencies were fixed, but 
not in terms of the U.S. dollar (FIXNUS). The presumption is that a country will fix its currency 
against the major currency (or currencies) in which its trade and investment flows are most 
  10heavily concentrated. As such, if currency volatility discourages FDI flows, countries operating 
fixed exchange rate regimes should be characterized by more FDI than those operating floating 
rate regimes, all other things constant.  Currency volatility will discourage FDI if risk-averse 
investors view such volatility as a direct cost (if hedging is used to reduce the volatility) or an 
indirect cost (if risk is unhedged).
16  Thus we expect that countries with fixed exchange rates 
should attract more FDI, but since we are dealing with U.S. FDI flows, these effects may be 
limited to those countries that peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar. 
  We also include a variable (DEXR) that measures whether a domestic currency 
appreciated or depreciated against the U.S. dollar over the sample period.  Specifically, the 
variable is measured as the ratio of the value of the exchange rate (in U.S. dollars) in a given 
year (lagged one year relative to FDI) to its average value over the two previous years.  Froot 
and Stein (1991), among others, argue that companies must usually fund international expansion 
through their retained earnings.  Hence, companies located in countries with relatively strong 
currencies should enjoy increased purchasing power in international asset markets, while the 
opposite will be true for companies headquartered in weak currency regions.  In the context of 
our model, U.S. MNCs should find it cheaper to acquire assets in countries whose currencies are 
depreciating against the U.S. dollar, other things constant. Conversely, asset acquisitions should 
become more expensive in countries with appreciating currencies.  Based on this argument the 
sign of DEXR should be negative. 
  One relevant caveat is that MNCs frequently fund a substantial portion of their overseas 
investments using financial capital raised abroad.  In such cases, it is theoretically unclear which, 
if any, specific currency represents the home currency. Another caveat is that U.S. MNCs expect 
to earn dividends and other receipts on their foreign direct investments, and those remittances 
will be converted from the host country currency to U.S. dollars.  Hence, an appreciating dollar 
implies lower U.S. dollar-based returns on U.S. direct investments in the country experiencing a 
depreciating home currency (Safarian and Hejazi, 2001).   
Obviously, the practical relevance of this latter point is sensitive to the nature of a foreign 
affiliate’s activities.  For example, if the affiliate is primarily exporting products priced in U.S. 
dollars, such as oil, the resulting income stream to the parent might be naturally hedged against 
depreciation of the local currency.  It is also sensitive to the anticipated permanence of the 
change in the local currency’s value.  Specifically, if the change reflects purchasing power parity 
  11differences between the U.S. dollar and the local currency, it is unlikely to be reversed soon after 
a foreign investment is made.  In many cases, therefore, the positive influence (on inward FDI 
from the U.S.) of lower U.S. dollar-equivalent asset prices might be offset by lower U.S. dollar-
equivalent returns on the relevant assets.  In this regard, recent evidence suggests that currency 
movements largely reflect underlying purchasing power changes, even over periods as short as 
several years (Taylor, 2000; Popell, 2001). 
Finally, we include a variable to account for physical proximity to the U.S.  This term is 
measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country is contiguous with the U.S. (Canada 
and Mexico).  The latter are also signatories, with the U.S., to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which lowers barriers to FDI.  Thus, this variable should be positively 
related to FDI.  We refer to the variable as PROXIMITY, but it may well reflect NAFTA effects.   
 
Omitted Control Variables 
In closing this section, we acknowledge some possible control variables that are omitted 
from our models.  Two obvious candidates are unit labour costs and tax rates.  Neither is 
included because the appropriate data could not be found for a sufficiently large sample of 
countries.  Data on wage rates are available, but wage rates are misleading because they can 
reflect productivity advantages (and are thus correlated with GDP per capita).  Consequently, it 
is not surprising that GDP per capita and relative wage rates are frequently either statistically 
insignificant or appear with the .wrong. signs in FDI regression equations.
17   
Likewise, most available tax measures are inappropriate. The conceptually appropriate 
measure to compare across countries is the marginal effective tax rate.  This rate differs across 
industrial sectors, and it is extremely difficult to measure (Chen, 2000). As well, there is 
considerable intra-country variation in tax rates within large countries, and simple averages may 
disguise the ability of a particular region to attract FDI.  Finally, any aversion to high taxes might 
be mitigated by their link to the provision of infrastructure that, in turn, is highly valued by 
international investors.  We were able to calculate one proxy measure for taxes, the ratio of 
government tax revenue to GDP. This measure does not capture the impact of taxation at the 
margin, and was not statistically significant in any preliminary estimated equations.  
Another variable commonly found in the literature is a measure of the openness of the 
economy, often measured as (imports + exports)/GDP (Grosse and Goldberg, 1991; Goldberg 
  12and Grosse, 1994).  In fact, this concept is captured by one of the KKZL indices, the measure of 
regulatory burden (REG), which includes factors such as tariffs and other trade restrictions.  
Thus, this measure, as well as the over-all GII index is, to some degree a measure of the 
openness of an economy.   
We also attempted to measure cultural distance using a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the recipient country has English as an official language. Common language is expected to 
facilitate FDI flows.  This variable was highly collinear with the legal system terms and, in 
particular, with either the LaPorta et. al. English Law variable or the University of Ottawa Pure 
Common Law term (r=.62 in both cases).  The language dummy variable was typically positive 
and statistically significant in the absence of the legal terms, but often lost significance when the 
latter were included (and vice-versa).  Thus we cannot rule out the possibility that the legal 
system terms, to some degree, measure cultural proximity.  On the other hand, studies that 
previously interpreted similar language terms as representing cultural factors exclusively may 
have confused cultural effects with the effects of legal systems.   
Finally, we considered the relationship between environmental quality and environmental 
regulation, and FDI flows.
  Although environmental regulation may increase the costs of doing 
business, and thus deter FDI, a clean environment may be associated with a higher quality of life, 
and thus attract FDI.  The KKZL regulation measure does not consider environmental regulation. 
One relevant measure is the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), created by The World 
Economic Forum, in conjunction with Columbia and Yale Universities.  The ESI index is 
derived from 22 factors that contribute to environmental sustainability including air quality, 
public health and environmental regulation.  The ESI index therefore reflects environmental 
infrastructure in the form of policy choices made by governments, as well as human capital 
reflected in public health conditions.  However, it is available only for a relatively limited sample 
of countries, as well as for only a single time period that post-dates the time period for the 
dependent variable.  Specifically, the earliest year for which ESI is available is 2000.  
Nevertheless we included this variable in provisional estimates (not reported) and found that it 
was never statistically significant. This result is broadly consistent with other studies reporting 
that tighter environmental regulations do not discourage inward FDI (Wheeler, 2001; 
Smarzynska and Wei, 2001).  
 
Estimation and Results 
  13 
Specification and Estimation 
  The equations to be estimated are (1) and (2) above.  For the first-stage (probit) 
equations, the dependent variable equals 1 if the country received positive FDI flows in that year, 
and zero otherwise.  For the second stage equations, the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
the dollar amount of FDI received in that year.  The independent variables may be broadly 
classified as either governance infrastructure variables (the KKZL indices and the legal system 
variables) or as control variables (ln GDP, HDI, proximity, and exchange rate variables). All 
independent variables are candidates for inclusion in either equation. 
  The first specification issue, common to both equations, is how to choose from among the 
governance infrastructure variables.  A representative correlation matrix for selected variables, 
including all of the governance infrastructure variables, is presented in Table 2, together with the 
means of the relevant variables.   Since we will work with several different samples, several 
correlation matrices are potentially relevant.  However, the correlation coefficients for the 
different samples are not very different from those presented in Table 2, which refers to the full 
sample of 143 countries (404 observations) considered. 
  Clearly, the various KKZL measures (VOICE, STAB, GOV, REG, LAW, and GRAFT) 
are highly correlated with each other, with correlation coefficients that range from 0.65 to 0.92.  
Given this degree of intercorrelation, it is not possible to use the relevant variables in the same 
equation.  As a consequence, they are either entered individually, or we use a summary measure 
that is their first principal component, denoted as GII.
18   
Since the KKZL variables are estimated, and because they are not available for each year, 
we also consider the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), published by the Heritage Foundation 
and the Wall Street Journal.  This index is based on a number of sub-indices, all of which are 
related to open and free markets, and macro-economic stability.  The index is available for each 
year of our sample period.  As can be seen, it is highly correlated with most of the KKZL 
variables, and with GII.
19   
  It is also clear (and not surprising) that many of the LaPorta et. al. legal system variables 
are quite highly correlated with the University of Ottawa legal system variables. Thus, the two 
legal system variables are never included in the same equation.  On the other hand, the 
correlation between individual legal system variables and the KKZL variables is moderate, 
  14suggesting that they can be included in the same equation. It is of particular interest that the 
KKZL Rule of Law measure is only moderately correlated with any of the legal system terms.  
The KKZL measure in fact includes a variety of outcome terms, including costs of crime, extent 
of tax evasion, police effectiveness, and various measures of the rule of law and the protection of 
property rights.  It does not, however, take into account the legal tradition of the country.  Thus it 
would appear that the KKZL Rule of Law measure and the legal system variables contain 
different information.  
  Finally, we note that the Human Development Index (HDI) is highly correlated with the 
individual KKZL variables, although in varying degrees.  For example, the simple correlation 
coefficient between HDI and GII is 0.68, thereby posing a potential multicollinearity problem if 
both variables are included in the same estimating equation.
20  Hence, we at times drop HDI 
from our estimating equation when its presence clearly affects the governance infrastructure 
terms that are our main concern. 
  The same basic specification strategy is followed for both equations  (1) and (2) above.  
In both cases, we first estimate a .full model. that includes one of the KKZL variables, one set of 
legal system variables plus all of the control variables (ln GDP, proximity, the exchange rate 
terms, year dummy variables and HDI). We then test restricted versions of the model until we 
arrived at a parsimonious and statistically acceptable specification.
21
Equation (1) is estimated by maximum likelihood techniques, and the restricted models 
are tested using likelihood ratio tests (Greene, 1993: 369-70). Equation (2) is estimated by 
ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. Restrictions are tested 
using standard F-tests. The Mills ratio, derived from Equation (1) is also included in the second 
stage estimate.  The estimation technique is a standard application of the method developed by 
Heckman (1979), and explained in Greene (1993: 711-13).  
The preferred equations were subjected to specification tests. For equation (1), Lagrange 
multiplier specification tests  (Verbeek, 2000: 188) reject the need to include higher order terms 
for GII (or any of its components) and HDI.  In the second stage equation, we tested for 
specification error through a series of one and two power RESET tests (Verbeek, 2000: 58-61). 
The simple linear specification described by equation (2) passed those tests, and, therefore, no 
interactive or higher order terms are included.  
  15Finally, all residuals were inspected for evidence of outliers.  Unless otherwise reported, none 
were found.  In addition, the role of potentially influential observations, specifically India and 
China, was examined by excluding one or both from the sample.  Unless otherwise indicated, 
those exclusions did not affect our results. 
    
Results 
The primary results for the FDI models are found in Tables 3 (first stage probit estimates) 
and Tables 4 and 5 (second stage estimates).  Each table presents results for total U.S. FDI flows 
to all countries, total U.S. FDI flows to developing and transition economies, and U.S. high-tech 
FDI flows to all countries.  
 
First Stage Results 
In the first stage of the estimation process (Table 3), the dependent variable is defined to 
take a value of unity if there were positive U.S. FDI flows to the sample country in a given year 
(1995-97), and zero otherwise.  For these equations, the proximity variable could not be included 
because it perfectly predicted FDI = 1, and would not allow convergence of the parameter 
estimates.  The specification tests discussed above indicated that a full model (containing ln 
GDP, one KKZL variable, one set of legal system dummies, HDI , two exchange rate terms and 
two year dummy variables) was always rejected in favor of a restricted model that contained 
only ln GDP plus one KKZL variable or one set of legal system variables.  Indeed, when a full 
model is estimated, almost all of the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant. As a 
consequence, we estimate and report each governance variable coefficient in a separate equation 
(Table 3).  Each reported coefficient is part of a separate estimated equation containing an 
unreported constant term and an unreported term for ln GDP, both of which are always 
statistically significant.  In general, the estimates show good explanatory power as indicated by 
their ability to correctly classify countries. 
These results indicate that governance is an important determinant of the probability that 
a country will receive U.S. FDI.  In general, there is little difference in the results between the 
total sample and a sample restricted to developing and transition economies.  In both cases, the 
more aggregate measures, GII and IEF are positive and statistically significant, although the 
coefficients are typically larger in the sample of developing and transition economies. However, 
  16not all of the KKZL variables are individually statistically significant. For these two samples, 
neither the rule of law, nor political instability/violence are statistically significant.  Moreover, 
judging from the size of the coefficients and the log likelihood statistic, a limited regulatory 
burden is the most important of the KKZL variables. It is important to recall that this term 
includes measures such as openness to trade, FDI restrictions, and price controls. Therefore, 
open economies are more likely to be recipients of U.S. FDI flows. Government effectiveness 
and graft appear to be the next most important factors. It is typically the case that the coefficients 
are higher in the sample of developing and transition economies.  In particular, the graft 
coefficient is much higher, indicating that U.S. investors tend not to locate in developing and 
transition countries where corruption is high. 
Although the rule of law term is not statistically significant in the two samples, the results 
clearly indicate that countries whose legal systems are rooted in English Common Law are more 
likely to be recipients of U.S. FDI flows.  This is true regardless of the legal classification system 
employed.  The University of Ottawa classification scheme reveals that countries that adopt legal 
systems that mix common law with customary or religious law are less likely to receive FDI, as 
are all civil law countries.  However, the LaPorta et.al. classification suggests that countries 
adopting French civil law are more likely to receive FDI than are other civil law countries, or 
countries whose legal systems are socialist.
22  In part, the differing results reflect differences in 
the allocation of socialist and former communist countries.  Specifically, the University of 
Ottawa system classifies them as civil law countries, while La Porta does not.  When the 
countries classified by La Porta et. al. as socialist are removed from the sample, none of the 
remaining La Porta legal system variables are significant.  However, using the University of 
Ottawa classification, it is still the case that Pure Common Law countries are more likely to 
receive FDI. 
We therefore conclude that governance infrastructure is an important determinant of 
whether a country is a recipient of U.S. FDI flows.  We can conclude that governance variables 
related to open markets, government effectiveness, graft and political accountability are 
important determinants of FDI.  Moreover, countries whose legal systems are rooted in English 
Common Law are also more likely to be recipients of U.S. FDI.   
It is noteworthy that the HDI term (and each of its components) is not statistically 
significant when total flows are considered.  This is true whether HDI is entered alone (with Ln 
  17GDP), or whether it is entered with other variables. In general, U.S. firms are more likely to 
locate in countries characterized by relatively large domestic economies and relatively good 
governance.  These factors appear to dominate wealth, education and health. 
  The results for high-tech FDI are somewhat different. The overall statistical fit of the 
Probit model is better, as evidenced by the high fraction of correct predictions.  The estimated 
coefficients are also generally higher than those for total FDI flows. In particular, the regulatory 
burden term is much larger, while the government effectiveness term is also higher.  The rule of 
law term is now significant at the .10 level.  Countries with common law backgrounds are more 
likely to receive high-tech FDI, which is consistent with the view that the common law provides 
greater protection for property rights.  In addition, HDI has a statistically significant and positive 
impact on the probability that a country will receive high-tech FDI, as do each of its components 
(not shown).  Moreover, when HDI is included in an equation with governance variables, it 
remains statistically significant.  Thus, there is some evidence that wealth and human capital are 
uniquely important for FDI in high-tech industries than for other industries.   Governance 
infrastructure is also distinctly important in high-tech industries.    
Second Stage Results 
  In estimating the second stage equations, we again began with a model including all 
control variables and then tested restricted versions using F-tests.  In this case, the full model 
(excluding year dummy variables) was always preferred, and the results are reported in Table 4.  
For ease of exposition, Table 4 contains results that use GII as a summary measure of the KKZL 
governance indices, together with separate equations using the two legal system classifications.  
Results obtained using each of the individual KKZL indices are summarized in Table 5 and will 
be discussed below. The dependent variable is specified as the natural log value of U.S. FDI 
(total or high-tech).  The tables present separate results for the full sample of countries, for the 
sample of developing and transition economies and for countries that receive high-tech 
investments.   The Mills ratio was never statistically significant and is, therefore, not included.
23   
Table 4 provides representative results obtained from ordinary least squares estimation of 
the pooled data.  For all samples, one set of estimates is provided using the University of Ottawa 
legal classification method, and another set is provided using the La Porta et. al. system.
24  
Additional specifications are provided in order to illustrate specific issues.  
  18The main variables of interest are GII and the legal system variables. For the most part, 
the results are similar to those reported for the first stage estimates.  That is, both effective 
governance and legal systems rooted in English Common Law tend to increase the amount of 
U.S. FDI received by a country.  However, the effects depend to a degree on the precise 
specification of the estimating equation, as well as the sample. For example, the Pure Common 
Law variable is more statistically robust in the All Countries and High-Tech samples than in the 
Developing and Transition Economies sample.    
We estimated equations with and without HDI (or its components).  We did so because of 
the intercorrelation between GII and HDI, and because of the possible causal relationship 
between them.  For the total sample (columns 1-4), we find that the GII index is positive and 
statistically significant when HDI is excluded, but it tends to lose significance in equations that 
contain HDI (or any of its components) and the University of Ottawa legal variables (column 2).  
The same variable remains statistically significant when HDI is included in an equation with the 
La Porta variables (column 4).  Thus, there is some evidence that wealth and human capital exert 
an independent and positive effect on FDI inflows.   
However, the results are somewhat different when the sample is restricted to developing 
and transition economies (columns 5-7).  As before, the GII term is positive and statistically 
significant when HDI (or any of its components) is excluded, but it loses significance when HDI 
is included, even for equations using the La Porta et. al. legal system classification (column 7). 
We interpret this result as indicative of the statistical difficulty in distinguishing human capital 
effects from governance effects.   
The results are again different for high-tech FDI flows (columns 8-10).  The GII term in 
this sample is always positive and statistically significant, as before; however, HDI term is rarely 
statistically significant, whether GII is included or not. On the other hand the education 
component of the HDI index is always positive and statistically significant, even with GII in the 
equation.  Thus, it appears that governance improvements will increase FDI flows in high-tech 
industries, but investments in education have additional and independent effects.    
Although it is generally true that countries whose legal systems emerged out of the 
English Common Law tend to attract more FDI (but not necessarily more high-tech FDI), other 
things equal, the relative impact of this effect depends on the method of classifying the legal 
system.  Using the University of Ottawa classification, it is typically the case that countries with 
  19Pure Common Law systems receive more FDI than do those with pure or mixed civil law 
systems. Using the La Porta method, countries using the English Common Law receive more 
FDI than do countries with socialist legal systems, but not necessarily more than all civil law 
countries.  For the total sample, it appears that countries using either the English or French 
system receive more FDI than do all other countries, including those adopting the German or 
Scandinavian system.  For developing and transition economies, countries whose legal systems 
are based on French Law receive more FDI than all countries. These differences are attributable 
to the classification of socialist countries.  When the socialist countries are removed from the 
sample, the apparent advantage of French legal systems disappears. 
Given these differences between the two legal classification systems, can we say that one 
classification system is preferable? To explore this issue, We treat equations using the two 
systems as being non-nested, and use the Davidson-MacKinnon J-test to test the hypothesis that 
one (or the other) is the .true. model (Greene, 1993:222-224).  For example, we test the null 
hypothesis that the model in column 1 (Table 4) is preferred to the model in column 3 (the 
alternative), and then reverse the procedure and test the null that the column 3 model is preferred 
to the column 1 alternative.  The null hypothesis is rejected in both cases, and this is the case for 
all samples and specifications.  Thus, it is apparently the case that neither classification method 
is fully comprehensive, and that further research is required into the optimal method of 
classifying national legal systems. 
One example of the differences between the two methods is provided by the results for 
high- tech FDI.  When the University of Ottawa classification method is employed, we find that 
pure common law countries attract more FDI, and this is true regardless of whether India 
and/China are included in the sample.  However, when the La Porta method is employed, the 
results do depend critically on the composition of the sample. For example, columns 9 and 10 in 
Table 4 present results when China is included and excluded from the sample.  China is 
classified by La Porta et. al. as a socialist law country.  It is also a country that receives 
significant amounts of high-tech FDI.  When China is included (column 9), the results indicate 
that countries with any other form of legal system receive significantly less high-tech FDI than 
do countries with socialist legal systems, other things equal.  When China is excluded (Column 
10), we observe that countries using the English Common Law receive more FDI, other things 
equal, and more than countries using any other legal system.
25   
  20It is possible that non-legal institutions protect property rights in China in a unique way 
that might explain the difference in results when China is included in the sample. In this regard, 
Zhang (2001) argues that Western FDI in China is motivated by its comparative political 
stability. Our governance or legal variables might not adequately capture this attribute. 
Before concluding this section, we comment on the control variables. We find that the 
coefficient for the GDP variable is positive and highly significant in all equations and for all 
samples.  Market size is therefore a critical determinant of both the probability of receiving FDI, 
and the amount received by any particular country.   The remaining control variables have 
somewhat different impacts, depending on the sample and specification. For the most part, the 
proximity variable is positive and statistically significant. Other things equal, both Canada and 
Mexico receive additional US FDI, likely the combined result of location and NAFTA 
membership.   Since Canada and Mexico are not included in the sample of developing and 
transition economies, there is no proximity term for that sample. 
Countries with fixed exchange rates attract more total FDI, but only if their exchange rate 
is pegged to the U.S. dollar.  This holds for all countries, but not necessarily for all forms of FDI.  
Specifically, we find some evidence that this variable is statistically significant for high-tech FDI 
(column 8), but not for all specifications (Columns 9 and 10). The exchange rate term is rarely 
statistically significant. When it is, the sign of the coefficient is negative. The exchange rate 
variable is consistently insignificant for the high-tech industries. In general, exchange rate 
regimes and exchange rate changes seem to have little effect on high-tech FDI. This result might 
reflect the possession of market power on the part of high-tech MNCs that, in turn, enables the 
latter to pass through to customers most, or all, of the explicit and implicit costs of exchange rate 
hedging. For other industries in which sellers do not enjoy such market power, a stable foreign 
currency is an important incentive, at the margin, to invest abroad.  
Decomposing Indices 
In this section we investigate the possibility that specific elements of the GII index may 
be more influential than the over-all index that we have used as a summary measure in Table 4.  
The disaggregated results are found in Table 5.  Rather than present all of the estimated 
coefficients for each specification, we present only the estimated coefficient for the relevant 
component of GII or the legal system.  In order to minimize problems of multicollinearity, as 
well as to conserve space, we present estimates obtained from a specification that did not include 
  21HDI or the legal systems variables.  Thus, the estimates reported are obtained from the 
estimation of an equation that includes the reported variables plus a constant, Ln GDP, the 
proximity variable, and the two exchange rate terms.  For completeness, we also estimate these 
equations using only the legal systems variables as governance measures. 
  To facilitate comparisons, we also present the results for GII itself.  The results confirm 
that this broad measure of governance is always positive and statistically significant in any 
sample, and the coefficient is remarkably stable. It can be seen, however, that while all 
components of GII are themselves statistically significant, their magnitude and explanatory 
power (as measured by the R
2) are not.  In particular, the most important of the sub-indices, as 
judged by both the magnitude of the coefficients and the predictive power of the equation, is 
government effectiveness and regulatory burden, and this is true of all samples.  The latter term 
is the most important, with predictive power exceeding that of GII, and with a coefficient that is 
larger than those for all the other governance measures.   
Thus, countries that adopt policies favoring free and open markets will receive more U.S. 
FDI, and this result seems robust across samples. This conclusion is confirmed by the results 
obtained using the Index of Economic Freedom as a measure of governance.  However, it is also 
true that other governance factors are important, although possibly not to the same degree. In 
particular, good governance also implies maintaining effective government institutions, and this 
is important for all samples.  
Most of the KKZL coefficients, as well as the Index of Economic Freedom coefficient, 
are slightly lower for the sample of developing and transition economies than for the All 
Countries sample. However, developing and transitional economies arguably have greater scope 
for improving governance, since the governance indices for those economies are substantially 
lower than those for developed countries.  A movement towards average governance for 
developed countries should therefore encourage a substantial increase in inward FDI flows.  
The results in Table 5 also tend to confirm the importance of English Common Law 
origins in attracting FDI when the University of Ottawa classification method is employed.  
However, the results are more ambiguous when the La Porta method is used.   In the latter case, 
countries whose legal systems originate in the English Common Law receive more FDI than do 
countries with socialist legal origins, but they do not necessarily receive more than civil law 
countries.   
  22In summary, our results point in a consistent direction. Specifically, they confirm the 
well-established fact that the size of a national economy strongly conditions how attractive that 
location is to foreign investors. They also strongly support the notion that governance 
infrastructure is an important direct determinant of whether a country will receive any U.S. FDI, 
and, if so, how much.  An inference suggested by our results is that countries wishing to receive 
FDI, most of which are small and developing, should consider improvements in political 
governance. Of the governance indicators considered, regulatory burden and government 
effectiveness are the most important.  While legal systems are less amenable to change, our 
results also suggest that countries whose legal systems are based on English Common Law are 
likely to have an advantage in attracting FDI. 
 
Summary and Policy Conclusions 
   This study assesses whether and to what extent governance infrastructure attributes of 
national economies influence U.S. FDI flows into those economies.  Governance infrastructure is 
measured in terms of the nature of political, economic and legal institutions and policies. The 
measures of governance infrastructure that are employed have not previously been used in the 
FDI literature, and cover a variety of factors such as government effectiveness, freedom of 
markets, political freedom and the nature of the legal system. 
 Our analysis uses a two-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, the probability that 
a country is an FDI recipient is estimated.  The results indicate that countries that fail to achieve 
a minimum threshold of effective governance are unlikely to receive any U.S. FDI.  In the 
second stage, the analysis is restricted to those countries that did receive FDI flows.  The 
estimated equations focus on the determinants of the amount of FDI received, with a correction 
for possible sample selection bias.  The results indicate that governance infrastructure also plays 
a critical role in the determination of the volume of U.S. FDI flows across countries.  In addition, 
no evidence of sample selection bias was found.   
  We find differences in results across different samples of countries, as well as different 
policy implications. For example, improvements in governance are likely to be more important 
for developing and transition economies than for all countries, on average.  Developing 
economies are the least likely to receive any positive FDI, and improvements in governance that 
put those countries over the minimum threshold will encourage positive FDI flows.  In addition, 
  23although we found that the marginal benefits (in terms of increased FDI inflows) of governance 
improvements for developing and transition economies that do receive FDI are lower than for all 
countries, the total benefits are likely to be greater, because the scope for governance 
improvement is commensurately greater. 
  We also find evidence that countries whose legal systems originate in English Common 
Law attract more U.S. FDI, other things equal.  However, the strength of this result depends on 
the method of classifying legal systems.  Since the evidence suggests that neither of the existing 
classification methods used in this study is perfect, further research is required into the 
appropriate classification method.  In particular, subsequent research must address the problem 
of how to classify the legal systems of formerly socialist countries.  Classification 
notwithstanding, it is clear that formerly socialist countries received less FDI, other things equal.  
It is doubtful that this can be fully explained as a result of their legal system. 
In addition, our results suggest that previous studies have, to some degree, confused 
issues of culture with issues arising from the nature of the legal system.  Many, if not most, 
countries that have adopted English Common Law are also English speaking.  Studies that use 
language as a measure of cultural proximity may therefore be capturing characteristics of the 
common law system that protect property rights and attract investment.  
  There is some evidence that FDI flows in high-technology industries respond to 
somewhat different determinants than is the case for all industries.  The differences are 
particularly marked in the first stage, where both governance and wealth and human capital are 
found to be important.  The probability that a country will be the recipient of high-tech FDI 
increases with its investments in human capital and with higher GDP per capita, while this is not 
so for all FDI.  In the second stage, the amount of high-tech FDI received is more closely linked 
to investments in human capital (education) than is the case for the total sample of industries. 
  The results also shed some light on the specific governance factors that are likely to 
attract U.S. FDI. Reliable estimation of the regression coefficients for individual governance 
measures is hampered by collinearity among many of the measures. Nevertheless, relatively 
robust findings are identified for specific governance infrastructure attributes. In this regard, 
good political governance is characterized by policies promoting open markets, as well as by 
effective and non-corrupt public institutions.  Countries that improve their governance 
  24infrastructures in these respects are not only likely to increase the probability that they will 
receive U.S. FDI, but they will also receive greater absolute amounts. 
   Hence, one of our most important conclusions is that political governance contributes in 
a very important way to attracting inward FDI from the United States. Furthermore, improved 
governance does not necessarily oblige governments to make large investments of taxpayers’ 
money. In this regard, our findings reinforce similar conclusions drawn in UNCTAD (1998) and 
Altomonte (2000). Indeed, improved governance might be more consistent, in many cases, with 
a smaller economic and regulatory role for government.  As well, any set of policies that broadly 
promotes economic growth will indirectly promote increased inward FDI by encouraging a 
higher level of real GDP.  However, it is also the case that countries whose legal systems are not 
rooted in English Common Law will find it relatively more difficult to attract U.S. FDI, other 
things equal.  Because changing the legal system is both difficult and expensive, such countries 
will have to compensate by improving other aspects of their governance infrastructure. 
Although our study focuses on the role of governance, we obtain other results of interest.  
For the most part, these results are consistent with those obtained in earlier studies.   For 
example, we find that market size is statistically the most important predictor of whether a 
country will receive FDI and, if so, the amount.  We also find that investments in human capital 
and the general quality of life are likely to attract more FDI, although these relationships may 
also be linked to good governance. In particular, countries that meet minimum governance 
standards tend to be countries with higher levels of wealth, health and education. Whatever the 
indirect linkage to governance, our results clearly identify an educated work force as an 
important determinant of U.S. FDI in high-tech industries. 
    Another of our findings is that fixed exchange rate regimes attract greater FDI flows. 
This result is indirectly consistent with other studies that find that currency stability promotes 
inward FDI flows. In our case, it is fixity to the U.S. dollar that matters which is unsurprising 
given our focus on FDI flows originating from the United States.  The weaker relationship 
between exchange rate regime and U.S. high-tech FDI might reflect the previously mentioned 
supposition that sellers of high-tech products face relatively inelastic demands curves, and 
therefore have less difficulty passing on the relevant costs associated with hedging foreign 
exchange risk. Exploration of this and other possible explanations is a focus of future research.  
We also find that currency appreciations or depreciations are not consistently related to inward 
  25FDI flows in a statistically significant manner. This latter result is theoretically unsurprising, and 
it is consistent with evidence from other studies (Safarian and Hejazi, 2001).       
Available data dictated that we focus on the nation-state as the unit of analysis. However, 
regions are increasingly emerging as clusters for specific types of foreign investment, and those 
clusters frequently cut across political boundaries. Our findings therefore highlight the potential 
importance of regional trade and investment agreements that harmonize attributes of governance 
infrastructure across political jurisdictions. Additional research focusing on the relationship 
between governance infrastructure and related variables and FDI originating in other developed 
countries would shed further light on the importance of political reform as an instrument of 
economic growth in developing countries. 
For international managers, our findings highlight the importance of understanding the 
political processes that lead to changes in governance infrastructure. Such changes clearly affect 
the ability of foreign-owned firms to do business profitably in host economies. Yet the 
determinants of such changes are not obvious.
26 Perhaps political risk analysis in multinational 
companies would be better focused on political and social initiatives affecting the likelihood of 
governance reforms than on the likelihood of changes in government. In addition, managers 
should consider more carefully the importance of the legal system in protecting shareholder 
rights and property rights. 
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Table 1 
Variables, Definitions and Data Sources 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION  SOURCE 
FDIUS  US FDI outflows, 1995-97, measured in logarithms  Bureau of Economic Analysis, various 
years 
FDITECH  US FDI outflows in chemical and allied products and electric and electronic 
equipment, 1995-97, measured in logarithms 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, various 
years 
GDP  Real GDP in 1990 $US,  1994-1996  United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1999 
HDI  Human Development Index, 1995 and 1997. HDI combines three measures: 
GDP per capita, education   a combination of adult literacy and school 
enrolment rates) and life expectancy at birth.  
United Nations Development Programme, 
various years 
GII  First Principal Component of Governance Indices   LAW,  STAB,REG, 
GOV, GRAFT, VOICE, developed by Kaufman et. al.,  1997a) 





LAW  Rule of Law Index, measures contract enforcement, property rights, theft and 
crime, etc. 
As above 
STAB  Political Instability and Violence Index, measures armed conflict, social 
unrest, ethnic tensions, terrorist threats etc. 
As above 
REG  Regulatory Burden Index, measures government intervention, trade policy, 
capital restrictions etc. 
As above 
GOV  Government Effectiveness Index, measures red tape and bureaucracy, waste in 
government, public infrastructure etc 
As above 
GRAFT  Graft and Corruption Index, measures corruption among public and private 
officials, extent of bribery etc. 
As above 
VOICE  Voice and Accountability  Index, measures civil liberties, political rights, free 
press, fairness of legal system etc. 
As above 
ESI Environmental  Environmental  Sustainability Index, 2000, based on 22 factors 
that contribute to environmental stability  air quality, public health, 
environmental regulation).  Ranges from 0-100. 
Available at: 
www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI
IEF  Index of Economic Freedom, based on a number of measures including trade, 
fiscal and monetary policy. 
Ranges from 0-5  low numbers indicate more freedom) 
Heritage Foundation and Wall Street 
Journal, available at: 
 www.heritage.org/search 
COMLAW1 Countries  whose  legal systems are based mainly on English Common Law  
case law is dominant).  Includes US, UK, and Canada. 
University of  Ottawa, Faculty of Law, at: 
www.uottawa.ca/world-legal-systems
COMLAW2  Countries whose legal systems, while base on common law, also include 
elements of customary law or Muslim law.  Includes Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and 
United Arab Emirates. 
As above 
CIVLAW1 Countries  whose  legal systems are based mainly on Roman legal system, 
which gives precedence to written l aw.  Includes Germany, Scandinavian 
countries, and many former socialist countries. 
As above 
CIVLAW2  Countries whose legal systems, while base on civil law, also include elements 
of customary law or Muslim law.  Includes Thailand, China, Egypt, and South 
Korea. 
As above 
ENGLAW  Countries whose corporate law or commercial law originate in English Law.  La Porta et. al.  1998) 
FRELAW  Countries whose corporate law or commercial law originate in French Law.  As above 
GERLAW  Countries whose corporate law or commercial law originate in German Law.  As above 
SCALAW  Countries whose corporate law or commercial law originate in Scandanavian 
Law. 
As above 
SOCLAW  Countries whose corporate law or commercial law originate in Socialist Law.  As above 
PROXIMITY, NAFTA 
 
Dummy variable = 1 for Canada and Mexico   
ENGLISH 
 
Dummy variable =1 if English is an official language  CIA World Fact Book  
FIXUS  Dummy variable = 1 if the country uses a fixed exchange rate, with currency 
pegged to the US dollar 
 
IMF International Financial Statistic 
Yearbook, 1996 
EXCHANGE RATE  Ratio of end period trade weighted exchange rate to average for preceding two 
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Correlation Matrix: Governance Infrastructure and Other Measures 
N=404 
 
  MEAN 
(SD) 
HDI GDP  VOICE  STAB


















HDI  .68 
(.20) 
1 . 0 0                     
GDP  9.87 
(1.94) 










.62  .37  .70  1.00                 
GOV  .03 
(.85) 
.63  .43  .74  .80  1.00                
REG  .13 
(.76) 
.49  .27  .70  .69  .73  1.00              
LAW  .06 
(.90) 
.67  .44  .70  .88  .89  .71 1.00             
GRAFT  .04 
(.89) 
.65  .43  .74  .76  .92  .65 .88 1.00           
GII  .05 
(.98) 













































.08 -.04 -.05  .03 -.18 -.22 -.12 -.18 -.13 -.14 -.30 .34 -.12 -.30 -.43 -.11 -.09 1.00
IEF  3.12 
(.76) 
.57 .33 .64 .60 .75 .79 .72 .69 .77 .38 -.02 .08 -.31 .22  -.23 .31 .21 -.24
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  (1) 
All Countries 
(2) 




High Tech Industries 
























Rule of law  .05  
(.08) 
.67 -253.6  .03 
(.10) 







.68 -251.4  .24*** 
(.09) 







.67 -.253.6  .03 
(.08) 







.67 -249.9  .33*** 
(.11) 







.73 -239.1  .50*** 
(.10) 







.68 -250.3  .33*** 
(.12) 








.68 -250.1  .26*** 
(.09) 
.61 -215.2 .29*** 
(.08) 
.82 -159.6 




.70 -241.8  .27*** 
(.11) 





Mixed Common Law 


























































.67 -253.4  .27 
(.40) 
.63 -218.8 2.04*** 
(.57) 
.82 -159.23 











1.  The dependent variable equals 1 if the US invests in that country (industry) and 0 otherwise. Figures in  parentheses are standard 
errors computed from analytic second derivatives  (Newton).  % refers to correct predictions.  Each equation contains unreported 
constant and LnGDP terms. Each is statistically significant in all equations.   
2.  GII is the first principal component of the voice, regulation, rule of law, graft, government effectiveness and political instability 
terms. 
3.  Categories are defined by the University of Ottawa Law School.  The omitted category is  Mixed Civil Law. 
4.  Categories are derived from LaPorta et. al. (1999).  Omitted category is Socialist Law. 
 
 *** p < .001, ** p < .05, *p < .01, two-tailed tests. 
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(.86) 
 


































































   3.14*** 
(.80) 
    
Education 
Index 





























2 .58 .60  .59  .61  .37  .41 .46  .42 .47  .45 
n  223 223 223 223 152 152 152 108  108  105 
 
1.  Dependent variable is Ln FDI. Estimation is by ordinary least squares. Figures in parentheses are heteroscedastic-
consistent (White) standard errors. 
2.  All countries that receive US FDI in chemicals and electronics included. 
3. Excludes  China. 
4.  The coefficient for Exchange Rate Change has been multiplied by 1000. 
 
                  *** p < .001, ** p < .05, *p < .01, two-tailed test.   




Regression Coefficients, GII Sub-Indices and Legal Variables 
  

































































































Pure Common Law 
 























































n  223   152   105   
 
For all samples, the coefficient estimates were obtained from OLSQ estimates of a model that included log GDP, a proximity dummy 
variable (not included in the sample of developing and emerging countries), a dummy variable if the country had a fixed exchange 
rate in terms of the US dollar, and a variable for the change in the exchange rate. The high technology sample excludes China. 
Figures in parentheses are heteroscedastic-consistent (White) standard errors. 
  *** p < .001, ** p < .05, *p < .01, two-tailed tests.
  ,     
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1 For a broader survey of the literature see Brunetti (1997). 
2 Dunning (1993) offers an extensive review of empirical studies of the determinants of FDI. Globerman and Shapiro (1999) 
provide an updated literature review with particular emphasis on the influence of government policies.  
3 The University of Ottawa data are available at: www.uottawa.ca/world-legal-systems.
4  Several of these factors are discussed in Brewer (1993) as aspects of government policies to address .market failures.. See, also, 
Gray and Dunning (2000). 
5 The relationship among these ideas is discussed in Globerman and Shapiro (2001). 
6 The complete list of sources is provided in Kaufmann et. al. (1999a). 
7 Differences between the KKZL Rule of Law measure, and the legal system classification methods are discussed below. 
8 Inward FDI can be negative, since the FDI variable measures net inflows. Hence, a negative value indicates net outward FDI. 
9 We also estimated the models using averaged data, but this did not alter the basic results. 
10 As noted above, we began with the sample of 143 of which 88 received positive US FDI flows over the period 1995-97.  The 
remaining countries either received no FDI, negative FDI, or were recorded as missing values.  We classified all of the latter as 
having no FDI. This particular classification does not affect the results.  For example, excluding missing values from the .no FDI. 
category does alter our conclusions. 
11 We estimated second-stage equations in which the dependent variable was specified as the proportion of total global FDI 
received by any country (PFDI), or the logistic transformation of PFDI. These measures were highly correlated with Ln FDI, 
suggesting some indifference as to the choice among them. The results are in fact similar, regardless of measure, and so we only 
present results based on the (natural) logarithmic specification. 
12 Dunning (1993) identifies an exhaustive list of such variables and also discusses empirical evidence regarding their 
importance. For additional summaries of available evidence, see Caves (1996) and Globerman and Shapiro (1999). 
13 Some studies identify a near perfect positive correlation between FDI and GDP across host countries. See, for example, 
Morisset’s (2000) study of African countries. 
14 The various sources of agglomeration (or external) economies are discussed in Krugman (1991). 
15 A number of studies have confirmed the importance of physical infrastructure as a determinant of FDI. See, for example, 
Kumar (1996), Zhao and Zhu (2000), Cheng and Kwan (2000), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Mody and Srinivasan (1998) and 
Loree and Guisinger (1995). In our sample, for example, GDP/capita is highly correlated with telephones/capita (r = .94). 
16 Several studies document a negative association between measures of foreign exchange volatility and FDI flows. See, for 
example, Kogut and Chang (1996) and Barrell and Pain (1997).  
17 Altomonte (2000) references several studies that provide ambivalent findings on the relationship between labour costs and the 
geographical distribution of FDI. 
18 In fact, when they are entered jointly in any equation, none of the KKZL variables are statistically significant, whereas many 
are significant when entered individually. We experimented with various subsets of the sub-indices, but there was no 
improvement on the reported results. 
19 We also attempted to assess the reliability of the KKZL measures by comparing them to the measure of political risk published 
by Institutional Investor Magazine (IIM). This measure is often used in the FDI literature (Keefer and Knack, 1997; Mody and 
Srinivasan, 1998; Bevan and Estrin, 2000), but was not available for our full sample. The correlation coefficient between the IIM 
risk variable and GII is r=.87, and similar values were obtained for the KKZL sub-measures.  
20 Causality may also be an issue in that HDI may be seen as a development outcome, caused by GII.  Evidence to this effect is 
found in Kaufman et.al. (1999b).  However, in the context of an FDI equation, each is likely to exert a separate effect. 
21 Country-specific fixed effects were not included because many important variables (notably the KKZL measures and the legal 
system variables) are time invariant and therefore capture permanent differences across countries. 
22 Note that there are no countries in the sample of developing and transition economies whose legal systems are German or 
Scandinavian in origin. 
  35 
23 In Table 4, the Mills Ratio was derived from first stage probit equations containing a constant, ln GDP and GII.  In Table 5, the 
Mills Ratio was obtained from probit equations containing a constant, ln GDP and the relevant governance variable.  The use of 
other specifications does not alter the results in any way. 
24 We have not included a separate term for pure civil law because it was never statistically significant. Thus, in the equations 
using the University of Ottawa definition of the legal system, the omitted category is all civil law countries. 
25 Note that China was the only country receiving high-tech FDI in this period that was classified as having a socialist legal 
system. When it is excluded, the omitted category became Scandanavian law countries.  
26 For example, Brewer (1983) suggests that policy instability is not closely linked to political instability. 
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